

Quarterly Flip Book

Summer 2023

Data as of June 30, 2023

CIO Office



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Q3-2023

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Myths & Reality

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Market timing in the long run



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Myth


The timing of your annual savings investment is of utmost importance for the well-being of your portfolio in the long run.

Reality

The timing of your annual savings investment will make a difference in the long run, but it is far from being the critical factor many seem to believe.

Case in point: consider an investor blessed with the power of perfect market timing (blue line) compared to another investor cursed with systematically picking the worst possible day to invest each year, over 30 years (red line). In the end, the market timing champion would have outperformed the most unfortunate of all investors by a mild 1% / year. If we take the more realistic example of an investor saving systematically at the beginning of each month, this annual outperformance shrinks below 1%.

How is such a small gap possible? Simply because **in the long run, the first year's return is superfluous. What truly matters is the frequency of savings and passage of time, not market timing.**



Reasons to sell?



Q3-2023

Myth

Selling in times of heightened uncertainty can protect investments from heavy losses.

Reality

Selling in times of heightened uncertainty is generally the best way to ensure heavy losses, as it often rhymes with selling low and missing the rebound.

More importantly, one should keep in mind that **the only certainty is that there will always be uncertainty, as it is the price to pay for capital appreciation in the long run.**

And – need we add – it isn't in the media's best interest to report the latest news with nuance and historical perspective; better to let fear and pessimism easily set in. However, the chart on the right should act as a reminder that letting emotions take over is a good recipe for short-term gain, but long-term pain.



Average return?



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Myth

Since the long-term historical average annual return on the stock market is ~10%, investors should expect to see calendar-year returns near 10%.


Reality

Quite the contrary, it is likely that **investors will only rarely see a calendar year where equity returns are close to their long-term historical averages.** Case in point: since 1957, only 8 years out of 63 have seen the Canadian stock market generate performance near average (+/- 2%).

One likely reason for this myth is the common misconception that “average” is synonymous with “typical.” However, there is no such thing as a “typical” year in the stock market.

As a result, investors should expect a wide range of possible outcomes in any given year, whereas only the passage of time can lead to an annualized return near the market’s long-term average.

Equity market calendar year total return: 1957 - 2022
S&P/TSX Composite



Equity performance in the long run



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Myth

Investing in the stock market is akin to gambling at a casino.


Reality

It is true that daily market fluctuations resemble a coin toss (see [page 36](#) for further details on this subject). Nevertheless, two fundamental reasons make investing completely different from gambling.

First, unlike the world of gambling, investing in the stock market is not a zero-sum game, as evidenced by the positive median annualized return (red dotted line). In the long run, equity returns come from companies' ability to grow their earnings, not from other investors' misfortune.

Second, while gambling remains just as uncertain no matter how long you “play”, the opposite occurs within equity markets, as evidenced by the narrowing range of outcomes over time (grey area). The longer one “plays” (i.e. remains invested), the greater the chances are of converging towards the premium investors earn for bearing equity risk.

Equity annualized total return over different investment horizons
S&P 500 since 1950



Dollar cost averaging or lump sum?



Q3-2023

Myth

Investors contemplating investing a large amount (e.g. an inheritance) are better off spreading their entry over time (dollar cost averaging) rather than committing the full amount immediately (lump sum).


Reality

It depends. But since 1980, **you would have been better off investing the full amount right away 83% of the time**, while the decision to split the investment evenly over twelve months would have cost an average of 2.8% in lost returns. This simple study assumes a portfolio* evenly balanced between Canadian bonds and global equities.

Of course, no one wants to put money to work right before a market correction, this myth being a prime example of one of the most well documented behavioural biases in finance: loss aversion.

Yet, think of it this way. Would you invest in a strategy that loses 8 times out of 10 and by an average of 2.8%? After all, these are the historical properties of dollar cost averaging.

How often has dollar cost averaging beaten a lump sum investment?



Home country bias



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Myth

It is more prudent to invest most of your portfolio in companies domiciled at home and thus of greater familiarity than to “risk it” with foreign corporations.

Reality


While predominantly investing in domestic equities might seem sufficient and feel comforting, **such a portfolio could, in fact, be just the opposite. Do not confuse familiarity with safety.**

For instance, Canada’s stock market’s high concentration in some of the most cyclical sectors and its relative lack of growth-oriented companies poses a risk that can result in unpleasant surprises if left undiversified.

The good news is that there are plenty of opportunities abroad to complement for such risks. After all, **Canadian stocks only represent 3% of the global equity investment universe... a far cry from the ~45% they account for in Canadians’ portfolios***. Home bias indeed!

Sector allocation spread - Canadian vs. World Equities

S&P/TSX less MSCI ACWI sector weights | 1-year moving average



Should investors fear recessions?



Q3-2023

Myth

Investors should be fearful of recessions as they entail heavy financial losses.

Reality


It is true that the most turbulent periods for markets are generally concomitant with recessions. As such, those with eyes riveted on daily stock exchange prices are very likely to experience fear in times of economic downturn.

However, if we step back from market fluctuations and look, rather, at the historical performance of a basic balanced portfolio* during the last six recessions, we see that **the average return was actually zero**. Not something to celebrate, but far from the financial catastrophe many seem to believe – especially when we consider returns in the previous and following years. What's more, let's not forget that recessions are relatively rare events, covering only 13% of the last 50 years.

Therefore, **it is not the recession that investors should fear, but fear itself...** or rather the risk of materializing heavy losses, when in the grip of emotion, at an untimely moment.

Balanced portfolio (60/40)* total return

| Recessions (NBER) | 12-months Before | During Recession | 12-months After | Full period** |
|-----------------------|------------------|------------------|-----------------|---------------|
| Nov 1973 - Feb 1975 | 7% | -7% | 12% | 11% |
| Jan 1980 - Jun 1980 | 11% | 9% | 7% | 31% |
| Jul 1981 - Oct 1982 | 9% | 15% | 26% | 57% |
| Jul 1990 - Feb 1991 | 4% | 6% | 9% | 21% |
| Mar 2001 - Oct 2001 | -1% | -5% | -8% | -14% |
| Dec 2007 - May 2009 | 1% | -16% | 9% | -8% |
| Feb 2020 - March 2020 | 16% | -9% | 22% | 28% |
| Average | 7% | -1% | 11% | 18% |



Are GICs a risk-free alternative?



Q3-2023

Myth



Guaranteed Investment Certificates (GICs) offer a risk-free alternative for investors seeking to at least preserve the purchasing power of their assets.

Reality

GICs are indeed among the safest investment vehicles available. However, their returns, while guaranteed, generally fail to cover inflation, leaving their holders at risk of seeing their purchasing power decline over time.

It should be specified that this observation is a reflection of the low interest rate environment prevailing over the past several years. For instance, although a 1-year GICs provided income above inflation in the 1990s, this has not been the case since 2009.

Ultimately, the selection of an investment vehicle depends on risk tolerance - GICs may therefore be the right choice for some. However, **a key risk for investors whose investment horizon is measured in years may not be the short-term volatility of other assets, but rather the potential erosion of their purchasing power over the long run.**



How strong is the “January effect”?



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Myth

Stocks generally perform better in January than in other months.


Reality

It is true that January has more often resulted in positive and high returns than what has been observed on average in the other months. However, this trend has largely faded or even inverted in recent decades.


Seasonal trends in the stock market seem to be more a matter of chance. Thus, it is not surprising that a seasonal trend observed in one period is not repeated in another period. Moreover, the observed differences in performance are usually of marginal importance.

Since the past is no guarantee of the future and seasonal trends are not always persistent, **an investor is well advised to ignore these historical observations and maintain a systematic investment plan.** There is no need to wait until January to make this good resolution!

Proportion of months with a positive return



Mean monthly return



Are rate hikes bad for stocks?



Q3-2023

Myth

Stocks generally perform poorly when central banks hike their policy rate.

Reality

Each rate hike cycle has its own set of circumstances that often bring additional volatility to markets. However, **what normally prompts central banks to raise their policy rate is usually an economy that is showing strength and is expected to continue to do so; a typically favorable environment for stocks.**

Case in point: since 1996, the yearly total return of the S&P/TSX averages 6.2% when the Bank of Canada hikes the overnight rate at least once, lower than the 9.3% average of all years over that same time period but still well into positive territory. Similar findings in the United States, where the average yearly total return of the S&P 500 is 8.1% when the Federal Reserve hikes its policy rate at least once.

To be clear, these historical trends are no guarantee for any specific year, as evidenced by the year 2022, whose unique circumstances led to substantial setbacks for stocks. Nevertheless, over the long run, odds remain in favor of patient investors, regardless of the ups and downs of policy rates.

Markets and rate hikes (data since 1996)

Canada

| Year | # of rate hikes* | Total return (S&P/TSX) |
|-----------------------------|------------------|------------------------|
| 1997 | 5 | 15.0% |
| 1998 | 3 | -1.6% |
| 2000 | 4 | 7.4% |
| 2002 | 2 | -12.4% |
| 2005 | 3 | 24.1% |
| 2006 | 4 | 17.3% |
| 2010 | 3 | 17.6% |
| 2017 | 2 | 9.1% |
| 2018 | 3 | -8.9% |
| 2022 | 16 | -5.8% |
| Average (rate hikes) | | 6.2% |
| Average (all years) | | 9.3% |

United States

| Year | # of rate hikes* | Total return (S&P 500) |
|-----------------------------|------------------|------------------------|
| 1997 | 1 | 33.4% |
| 1999 | 3 | 21.0% |
| 2000 | 4 | -9.1% |
| 2004 | 5 | 10.9% |
| 2005 | 8 | 4.9% |
| 2006 | 4 | 15.8% |
| 2015 | 1 | 1.4% |
| 2016 | 1 | 12.0% |
| 2017 | 3 | 21.8% |
| 2018 | 4 | -4.4% |
| 2022 | 17 | -18.1% |
| Average (rate hikes) | | 8.1% |
| Average (all years) | | 10.7% |

Stock performance and the political party in power



Q3-2023

Myth

The political party of the government in power has a significant impact on equity market returns.


Reality

Over the very long term, history shows that stock markets have been successful in continuing their upward trend regardless of which political party is in power.

For example, since 1901, the annualized total return of the S&P 500 has been largely positive during both periods with a Democratic president in office (11.9%) and periods with a Republican president in office (7.8%). Moreover, the difference between these two returns seems to stem primarily from the economic environment over which politicians have limited control, with Democrats taking power at the bottom of the Great Depression in 1933 and at the bottom of the financial crisis in 2009.

In the end, **history shows that investors benefit from not letting politics and investments mix**, as difficult as that may be at times!

Growth of a dollar invested in the S&P 500: January 1901 - June 2023




Economy

Q3-2023


CIO Office




Historical U.S. economic growth



Recent U.S. economic growth



Historical Canadian economic growth




U.S. economic cycles




Normalized U.S. economic cycles

U.S. Coincident economic indicator | % from pre-recession peak




The current cycle began in February 2020, at the peak of the previous cycle. Following the March 2020 plunge at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, the economy rebounded rapidly and is now already above its previous peak, making it one of the fastest recoveries in history.


U.S. unemployment rate




U.S. labour market – Payrolls



U.S. labour market – Employment sector



U.S. federal finances – Surplus & deficits




U.S. federal finances – Debt held by the public



250 Years of Federal Debt Held by the Public


% of GDP

Actual Projected



- A** Civil War
- B** World War I
- C** Great Depression
- D** World War II
- E** COVID-19

Cost of debt in the U.S.




U.S. corporate and household debt



U.S. Corporate and Household Debt

In % of GDP



US households debt decreased significantly over the last decade...


... but the COVID-19 pandemic seems to have put an end to this trend.

Risk and uncertainty – Geopolitical risk



Geopolitical risk since 1899

Matteo Lacoviello Geopolitical Risk Index



- A** Russian-Japanese War
- B** WWI
- C** WWII
- D** Korean War
- E** Vietnam War and Cold War
- F** Lebanon and Falklands War
- G** Gulf War
- H** 9/11 attack
- I** Iraq invasion
- J** Isis escalation
- K** COVID-19 pandemic
- L** Russian invasion of Ukraine

Risk and uncertainty – Economic policy uncertainty




Economic Policy Uncertainty and Equity risk




- A** Russian Crisis/LTCM
- B** 9/11 attack
- C** Iraq invasion
- D** Great Financial Crisis
- E** Euro crisis
- F** Debt ceiling dispute
- G** European refugee crisis
- H** Brexit
- I** U.S. elections
- J** Trump's "trade war"
- K** COVID-19 pandemic
- L** Runaway inflation / Fed pivot

World demographics – Age group trends




World demographics – Geographical breakdown



U.S. Demographics




U.S. age pyramid



Canadian Demographics



Canadian age pyramid




Equities


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
U.S. equity market since 1920



U.S. equity market cycles




Decomposition of equity returns



Daily Stock Market Fluctuations




Distribution of daily S&P 500 fluctuations
S&P 500 index over the last 40 years



Market fluctuations are normal, both mathematically* and literally. While only the few "extremes" end up in the evening news and morning shows, the truth is they don't matter all that much.

What really matters is the accumulation of "0% to 1%" days that rarely make the headlines, but explain much of the 12.3% S&P 500 annualized total return over the last 40 years... despite the fact that the index closes in the red almost every other day.


Equity valuations since 1920



Valuations and equity returns since 1920 – Part I




Valuations and subsequent 10-yr return
S&P 500



Robert J. Shiller's Cyclically-Adjusted Price-Earnings ratio, or CAPE, is often used to estimate long-term (10-15 years) equity returns.


The measure shows a strong inverse relationship between a current equity valuations and subsequent annualized returns, going back all the way to 1920.

Valuations and equity returns since 1920 – Part II




Current valuations suggest a
● 8.5% annualized total return over the next 10 years.


U.S. Equity valuation metrics – P/E




U.S. equity valuation metrics – P/B




U.S. Equity valuation metrics – Earnings yield & rates




U.S. Equity valuation metrics – Dividend yield




Canadian equity valuation metrics – P/E




Canadian equity valuation metrics – P/B



Canadian equity val. metrics – Earnings yield & rates




Canadian equity valuation metrics – Dividend yield




S&P 500 sector weights




S&P 500 sector weights
Percentage of index market value



S&P 500 sector properties – Beta to index




S&P 500 sector properties – Correlation to 10-year rates




S&P/TSX sector weights



S&P/TSX sector weights
Percentage of index market value




S&P/TSX sector properties – Beta to index



S&P/TSX sector properties – Correlation to 10-year rates



Sector correlation with CA 10-year rates




Rates


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
Inflation long-term history



U.S. rates: Looking back 150 years



U.S. monetary policy




Fixed income return expectations – Treasuries



US Treasury yield and subsequent return

BofAML treasury index annualized return




Over an investment period matching a bond's maturity, subsequent annualized returns will match closely the starting yield to maturity.

In the case of government bond indexes, differences between the two measures can occur due to reinvestment risk and the changes in index composition over time.

Fixed income return expectations – Investment grade



US IG bonds yield and subsequent return
BofAML US corporate bonds index annualized return



Over an investment period matching a bond's maturity, subsequent annualized returns will match closely the starting yield to maturity.

In the case of investment grade corporate credit indexes, differences between the two measures can occur due to reinvestment risk, changes in index composition over time, as well as downgrades and defaults.

Sovereign bond yield curves



| | 3 month | 6 month | 1 year | 2 year | 5 year | 10 year | 15 year | 20 year | 30 year |
|---------------|---------|---------|--------|--------|--------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| Japan | -0.13% | -0.14% | -0.12% | -0.08% | 0.05% | 0.40% | 0.77% | 1.00% | 1.23% |
| Switzerland | 1.65% | 1.72% | 1.92% | 1.22% | 1.00% | 0.97% | 0.99% | 0.96% | 0.91% |
| Portugal | 2.84% | 2.71% | 2.69% | 3.01% | 2.94% | 3.13% | 3.51% | 3.48% | 3.50% |
| Netherlands | 3.31% | 3.42% | | 3.18% | 2.78% | 2.74% | 2.77% | 2.73% | 2.64% |
| Belgium | 3.43% | 3.54% | 3.67% | 3.24% | 2.89% | 3.06% | 3.25% | 3.33% | 3.41% |
| Ireland | 0.69% | 0.99% | 3.46% | 3.26% | 2.86% | 2.82% | 3.13% | 3.11% | 3.16% |
| Germany | 3.37% | 3.52% | 3.61% | 3.27% | 2.59% | 2.39% | 2.50% | 2.49% | 2.39% |
| France | 3.39% | 3.55% | 3.68% | 3.34% | 2.90% | 2.94% | 3.15% | 3.27% | 3.28% |
| Austria | | | 3.54% | 3.42% | 2.99% | 3.05% | 3.07% | 3.06% | 3.01% |
| Denmark | 3.14% | 3.33% | | 3.45% | 2.90% | 2.73% | | 2.75% | |
| Sweden | 3.65% | 3.63% | | 3.48% | 2.78% | 2.56% | 2.63% | 2.65% | |
| Spain | 3.44% | 3.59% | 3.80% | 3.50% | 3.26% | 3.39% | 3.63% | 3.76% | 3.84% |
| Finland | | | | 3.54% | 2.98% | 2.96% | 3.12% | | 2.84% |
| Italy | 3.57% | 3.72% | 3.85% | 3.92% | 3.76% | 4.07% | 4.24% | 4.38% | 4.27% |
| Australia | | | 4.36% | 4.20% | 3.94% | 4.00% | 4.14% | 4.29% | 4.33% |
| Canada | 4.92% | 5.06% | 5.15% | 4.59% | 3.68% | 3.27% | | 3.24% | 3.09% |
| United States | 5.31% | 5.47% | 5.42% | 4.87% | 4.12% | 3.81% | | | 3.84% |
| UK | 5.18% | 5.68% | 5.35% | 5.26% | 4.66% | 4.39% | 4.53% | 4.51% | 4.42% |
| New Zealand | 5.74% | 5.82% | 5.45% | 5.29% | 4.61% | 4.64% | 4.80% | 4.86% | |



Cross assets

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U.S. risk premiums – Summary




Historical returns, volatility, and risk premiums


| Asset classes | Volatility | Real returns | Risk premiums | Full period* | Past ten years |
|----------------------|------------|--------------|---------------|--------------|----------------|
| Inflation | 1.8% | 2.9% | | | |
| 3-month T-bills | 1.8% | 0.3% | | | |
| Long-term Treasuries | 9.0% | 2.1% | Term | 1.9% | 0.9% |
| Long-term corps | 8.0% | 2.9% | Default | 0.7% | 3.6% |
| Large cap equities | 18.7% | 7.1% | Equity | 4.9% | 10.8% |
| Small cap equities | 28.0% | 8.7% | Size | 1.6% | -2.4% |

Risk premiums within U.S. capital markets have been well documented and tend to be stable over long enough periods of time (15-20+ years). Important deviations can occur though over shorter timespans, as was evident these past ten years.

U.S. risk premiums – Fixed income



U.S. risk premiums – Equities



U.S. risk premiums – Cumulative returns




Real Total Cumulative Returns

Dec. 1925 = 100




Over long enough investment horizons, the importance of volatility risk diminishes (see [page 7 – Equity Performance in the Long Run](#)), while the risk of underperforming through poor asset allocation decisions can increase significantly.


US dollar secular trend & components – Part I



US dollar secular trend & components – Part II




US dollar secular trend & components – Part III



A reduction of trade barriers between the US and China, as well as Mexico since the 90s has helped the latter two countries gain more prominence as trading partners.


Canadian dollar & purchasing power parity



Canadian dollar & crude oil



Canadian dollar and oil prices




As Canadian oil and crude bitumen exports grew rapidly starting in the mid-2000s, the country's currency became more closely entangled with those assets' price movements.

Oil prices – Nominal vs real prices



Historical oil prices - Nominal vs Real

US\$ per barrel* | log scale | 1861-2022




~ Nominal prices

~ Real prices (2018 dollars)


- A** US Civil War (1862-1865)
- B** West Coast gasoline famine (1920)
- C** Great Depression (1930s)
- D** Arab states embargos (1973-1974)
- E** Iran revolution (1978-1979)
- F** Rising Asian demand (2000s)
- G** Arab Spring (2011)
- H** Supply glut (2014-2015)
- I** COVID-19 pandemic (2020-...)



Oil prices – Consumption by country



Oil prices – World supply and demand



Bear market performances – Price returns



S&P 500 Bear Markets (1950-2022)

| Peak | Trough | # days | Period Drawdown | # days to recover | Cumulative price return over the following: | | | |
|-----------------|------------|------------|-----------------|-------------------|---|------------|------------|------------|
| | | | | | 6 months | 12 months | 24 months | 36 months |
| 1956-08-02 | 1957-10-22 | 446 | -22% | 337 | 8% | 31% | 47% | 42% |
| 1961-12-12 | 1962-06-26 | 196 | -28% | 434 | 20% | 34% | 53% | 71% |
| 1966-02-09 | 1966-10-07 | 240 | -22% | 209 | 22% | 32% | 37% | 30% |
| 1968-11-29 | 1970-05-26 | 543 | -36% | 650 | 19% | 48% | 54% | 61% |
| 1973-01-11 | 1974-10-03 | 630 | -48% | 2,114 | 35% | 37% | 68% | 54% |
| 1980-11-28 | 1982-08-12 | 622 | -27% | 83 | 43% | 58% | 48% | 88% |
| 1987-08-25 | 1987-12-04 | 101 | -34% | 600 | 13% | 19% | 50% | 35% |
| 2000-03-24 | 2002-10-09 | 929 | -49% | 1,694 | 13% | 28% | 45% | 57% |
| 2007-10-09 | 2009-03-09 | 517 | -57% | 1,480 | 48% | 63% | 96% | 94% |
| 2020-02-19 | 2020-03-23 | 33 | -34% | 148 | 52% | 74% | 99% | -- |
| 2022-01-03 | 2022-10-12 | 282 | -25% | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Average: | | 413 | -35% | 775 | 27% | 43% | 55% | 59% |

Bear market performances – Excess returns



Average Excess* Total Returns Following S&P 500 Bear Markets (since 1980)

| Asset (USD) | Beta*** | Avg. bear market excess returns | Cumulative excess return over the following: | | | |
|------------------------|---------|---------------------------------|--|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| | | | 6 months | 12 months | 24 months | 36 months |
| MSCI World Index | 1.01 | 2% | 7% | 8% | 8% | 13% |
| WTI | 1.01 | 11% | 4% | 22% | -9% | 51% |
| S&P/TSX (CAD) | 0.83 | -2% | 6% | 10% | 10% | 19% |
| Gold | 0.00 | 34% | -12% | -31% | -41% | -35% |
| FTSE Canada Overall | -0.02 | 45% | -18% | -30% | -34% | -20% |
| DXY | -0.14 | 45% | -33% | -48% | -57% | -64% |
| U.S. 10-yr Gov't Bench | -0.16 | 53% | -23% | -39% | -42% | -29% |

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